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REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FUNDING AND
SPENDING FOR FEDERAL OFFICE
Roscoe L. Barrow*
The election process is the heart of representative democracy.
While major reforms of the process have been achieved through
the one man, one vote principle' and the abolition of poll tax and
property qualifications for voting,2 our election system remains
inadequate. One major inadequacy of the system has arisen from
the failure of government to respond satisfactorily to the problems
inherent in traditional means of campaign funding.
Heard has correctly stated that the chief requirements for an
acceptable means of financing political campaigns are:
(1) that sufficient money be available to sustain the great
debate that-is politics, which means to assure the main con-
testants an opportunity to present themselves and their ideas
to the electorate; (2) that the needed sums be obtained in
ways that do not inordinately weight the processes of govern-
ment in favor of special political interests; and (3) that the
system command the confidence of the citizenry whose gov-
ernmental officials are chosen through it.3
Today political campaigns are being won or lost on the basis of
the size of campaign chests, and most winning candidates are
subservient, to varying degrees, to their principal financial suppor-
ters. Consequently, much of the electorate is losing confidence in
the election process. The health of our self-governing society
depends upon reform in the funding of that process.
This article will detail significant data on campaign funding and
spending, describe the major laws for regulating campaign funding
*Wald Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. B.S.A.S., 1935, Illinois Institute of
Technology; J.D., 1938, Northwestern University. Travel expense incident to research for
this article was granted by the Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law.
ISee Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and subsequent cases discussed in Com-
mentary: One Man, One Vote and the Political Convention, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (197 1).2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (fourteenth amendment equal protection clause bars state from making payment of
a state tax a prerequisite to voting); and Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969)
(equal protection clause bars a state from limiting to "property taxpayers" the right to vote
in elections called to approve issuance of revenue bonds of a municipal utility).
3 A. HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 430-31 (1960). This book is the most
scholarly and significant study of the effect of campaign spending on the political process.
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and spending, analyze the constitutional issues raised by these
laws, and propose changes to render the laws safer from attack on
grounds of unconstitutionality and more effective in achieving a
viable election process.
I. SIGNIFICANT DATA ON FUNDING OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS
In recent years there has been loud complaint about the high
cost of political campaigns. 4 Alexander has found that total politi-
cal costs in the United States rose from $200 million in 1964 to
$300 million in 1968, an increase of 50 percent in four years.5 A
substantial factor in the rising cost of political campaigns is the
increasing use of television for political purposes and the great
expense of that medium. Total expenditures for broadcasting in
the presidential nomination and general election campaigns in
1968 were $28.5 million, more than twice as much as was spent
on broadcasting in 1964.6 For primary and general elections at all
levels, a total of $59.9 million was spent for broadcasting in 1968,
an increase of 70 percent over that spent in 1964. 7
Whether the cost of political campaigns should be characterized
as "high" or "low" involves a value judgment. In a representative
democracy, maintaining the election process must be prominent in
our scale of values. For a nation which has an annual gross
national product of more than a trillion dollars, $300 million
dollars-the cost of all election campaigns in the peak year of
1968-may not seem a "high" cost. Indeed, the largest corporate
advertiser in the United States spent almost as much on advertis-
ing in 1968.8
The gravamen of the funding of political campaigns is not
"high" cost but the disparate availability of campaign funds to
parties and candidates. Members of wealthy families have a sub-
stantial advantage in politics because they can finance their own
campaigns. Two brothers Kennedy served simultaneously as Sen-
ators of Massachusetts and New York, and two brothers Rock-
efeller served simultaneously as Governors of Arkansas and New
York. On the other hand, many other aspirants must forego seek-
4 This theme runs throughout the hearings on the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971. See Hearings on S. 1, S. 382, and S. 956 Before the Subcomm. on Communications
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., I st Sess., ser. 92-96 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings].
5 H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1968 ELECTION 1 (1971). This book is the most
incisive analysis of campaign spending in recent elections.
6 Id. at 5.
7 Id. at 93.
8 Senate Hearings 637.
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ing political office for lack of financial support. For example,
Senator Fred Harris of Oklahoma withdrew from the presidential
prenomination campaign in November 1971, the campaign barely
having begun, for lack of funds. The unavailability of campaign
funds could convert our representative democracy to a plutocracy
of the wealthy. 9
Money does not always win elections. 10 In 1964 incumbent
President Johnson won reelection notwithstanding that the Re-
publican Pa-rty and Senator Goldwater had a financial advan-
tage." However, in the presidential election of 1968, one of the
closest popular votes in our history, the Republicans spent twice
as much money as the Democrats. 12 Senator Humphrey's serious
financial handicap certainly contributed to his defeat by President
Nixon. As most campaign managers would say, the sine qua non
of political success is money.
Another serious concern is the contribution or loan of large
sums by a person or special interest. Inevitably, the successful
candidate becomes subservient to some degree to the persons or
special interests which provided the financial support necessary
for election. Campaign contributions may, of course, be motivated
by several factors, some of which shore up the political process
and others which undermine it. A contributor of a huge sum may
desire governmental reform and, not being able to become a
candidate himself, feel a responsibility to provide financial support
to worthy candidates; or he may make a large contribution in the
hope of receiving from the successful candidate a quid pro quo in
the form of appointive political or diplomatic office or business
preferment or other private privilege.' 3 Whatever the motive, a
gift of the magnitude of almost $1.5 million, that reported by Mrs.
John D. Rockefeller, Jr., as her contribution to the Republican
Party in 1968,14 gives to wealthy persons a power in the election
process far beyond that of the average American and contravenes
the notion of equality of citizens underlying the one man, one vote
principle.
Large contributions by wealthy families and business execu-
9 Editorial, New York Times, November 12, 1970, at 42, col. 2.
10 A. HEARD, supra note 3, at 16, suggests caution in assuming that a winning candidate
having the larger campaign chest won election for that reason. He points out that there are
many other factors, such as the substance of the campaign issues and the candidate's
popularity. However, during the period in which Heard's data were obtained, the gap
between Republican and Democratic campaign expenditures was moderate. Id. at 19. In
recent years this gap has widened.
11 H. ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at I.
12 Id.
13 A. HEARD, supra note 3, at 71-72.
14 H. ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 29.
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tives are made principally to the Republican Party. For example,
in 1968 of all contributions of $500 or more, totalling $17.5
million, Republican committees received 72 percent of the num-
ber of contributions and 73 percent of the dollars contributed. 15
On the other hand, labor, through political action committees,
largely supports the Democratic Party. 16 Of even greater concern
than large contributions are large loans. 17 Inability to repay the
loan poses a grave danger of subserviency of the elected official to
the lender.
These circumstances may cause a large segment of society to
lose confidence in the election process. Even in presidential
elections when interest is highest, less than two-thirds of the
electorate go to the polls and the percentage of the electorate
participating in the election process is declining.' 8 There appears
to be a movement toward depoliticization and party decomposi-
tion1 9 with the possibility that nonparticipants may seek solutions
to society's problems outside of the election process. Reform of
the election process is necessary to maintain and enhance the
confidence of the electorate in our political system.
II. MAJOR LAWS REGULATING CAMPAIGN FINANCING
A. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
Over the years a number of laws have been enacted to regulate
campaign contributions and expenditures, but most have been
ineffective. In January of 1972, Congress passed the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, the first major statutory reform
in this area of the law in over fifty years. This comprehensive Act
will govern the financing of presidential as well as congressional
campaigns and regulate the use of the broadcast and other com-
munications media for political purposes.
1. Limitations upon Contributions and Expenditures by Corpo-
rations, Labor Unions and Government Contractors-In 1907
a predecessor of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act prohibited
corporations from making financial contributions in federal elec-
15 Id. at 162.
1
6 Id. at 191.
17 For an analysis of data on political campaign loans, see id. at 153-54, 177-79.
18 A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER 49
(abr. 1964).
19 W. BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS
71-91 (1970).
Campaign Funding and Spending
tionS. 20 In 1943 the War Labor Disputes Act temporarily prohib-
ited labor unions from making direct contributions in federal elec-
tions, 21 and in 1947 the Taft-Hartley Act permanently prohibited
labor unions from making a contribution or expenditure in federal
elections and made the limitation on political activity of corpo-
rations identical. 22 In general the 197 1 Act retains these statutory
provisions and strengthens similar provisions applicable to gov-
ernment contractors. 23 The Act does, however, amend the prohi-
bition against political activity by labor organizations and corpo-
rations to except any communications by a labor organization to
its members and their families and by a corporation to its share-
holders and their families, as well as non-partisan registration and
voter turnout activities by unions or corporations. 24 This amend-
ment largely codifies judicial decisions interpreting the existing
statute.
25
Examining with particular emphasis the limitations placed upon
the campaign financing activities of corporations and labor unions,
the purpose of these limitations has clearly been to prevent the
officials of these institutions from using funds of corporate share-
holders or union members to influence the outcome of elections or
to support candidates or parties which some shareholders or
union members might not favor.26 To a significant degree, this
legislation has limited the participation of corporations and labor
organizations in the election process. Nevertheless, for a variety
of reasons, contributions from corporations and labor organ-
izations continue to be a substantial factor in elections.
The management of corporations may still make individual
contributions to parties and candidates. A corporation's board of
directors can establish executive compensation at a level which
takes into account the asserted responsibility of management to
participate in the election process and then urge management to
assume its responsibility. Moreover, a corporation is not prohibit-
ed from urging employees to contribute to the party or candidates
20Ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907). For a comprehensive description of the federal regu-
latory statutes, see Lobel, Federal Control of Campaign Contributions, 51 MINN. L. REV.
1 (1966).
21 Ch. 144, 57 Stat. 163 (1943).
22 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 304, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970).
23 Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 206 (Feb. 7. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Election Act].
24 Election Act § 205.
25 Rice, Unions in the Political Arena: Legislative Attempts to Control Union Participa-
lion in Politics, 23 Sw. L.J. 713, 716-21 (1969): Wood. Corporations and Politics, 22
Bus. LAWYER 775, 777 (1967).
26 United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106. 115 (1948).
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of their choice, and many corporations do this. 27 By restricting
this solicitation to the management level, the corporation can
assure that the contributions will be made largely to a party or
candidates preferred by the corporation. Furthermore, many busi-
ness and professional political action committees contribute over-
whelmingly to the Republican Party and Republican candidates. 2 1
Similarly, labor organizations indirectly engage in political activity
through political action committees which usually expend volun-
tary employee contributions in support of the Democratic Party
and Democratic candidates. 29 Corporations and labor organ-
izations may also engage directly in activities which affect the
outcome of elections, such as taking a position on a controversial
issue which aids the party or candidate which shares the corpo-
ration's or labor organization's view, and using funds to enable
voters to register.
2. Limitations on Expenditures by or in behalf of Candi-
dates-The Act limits the amount that a candidate or others
acting in his behalf may spend for the use of all communications
media to ten cents per resident of voting age in the applicable
geographical area or $50,000, whichever is greater.30 Not more
than 60 percent of this amount may be spent on broadcasting.31 In
the case of presidential election campaigns, this percentage limita-
tion is applied on a state by state basis, rather than nationally, so
that a disproportionate sum may not be spent in key states.
3 2
Prior to passage of the Act, federal law limited to $5,000 the
amount which any person could contribute during any calendar
year or in any campaign to or on behalf of any candidate for
political office, or to or on behalf of any political action committee
supporting a candidate for any office. 33 Unfortunately, this provi-
sion permitted a person to contribute the $5,000 maximum to
every political action committee even though several committees
supported the same candidate.3 4 Also, while no political action
committee was permitted to receive or expend more than $3
million in any calendar year,35 the purpose of the legislation was
circumvented by establishing as many political action committees
as there were multiples of $3 million available. Finally, state, local
27 Wood, supra note 25, at 780.
28 H. ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 200-08.
29 Id. at 194-200; Rice, supra note 25, at 714.
30 Election Act § 104(a)(I)(A).
31 Id. § 104(A)(I)(B).
32 Id. § 104(a)(3)(A).
33 Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, § 4, 54 Stat. 767.
34 Lobel, supra note 20, at 22-23.
35 Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, § 6, 54 Stat. 772.
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and territorial committees were expressly excepted from the
law.
38
The Act repeals these contribution and committee expenditure
limitations.3 7 This raises the question whether placing the max-
imum limitation only on expenditures for use of media in political
campaigns is sufficient to prevent undue influence on elections by
expenditure of large sums of money in other ways.
With regard to the amount which a candidate may spend from
his personal funds or funds of his immediate family, the Act limits
the sum to $50,000 in the case of President or Vice-President,
$35,000 in the case of Senator, and $25,000 in the case of Repre-
sentative or other federal office.38 This should somewhat reduce
the advantage of wealthy candidates. Under previous law the
limitations did not apply to candidates for executive office,39 and
many types of expenditures were excepted from the limitation.
40
Nevertheless, the possibility remains that a candidate will circum-
vent the limitation by making gifts to trusted friends or political
action committees in anticipation of a future campaign, with such
persons and committees later making the contributions and ex-
penditures in the wealthy candidate's behalf.
The Act strengthens prohibitions against offering employment,
subcontracts, or other benefits available under a federal program
in exchange for political support.4 ' Moreover, the Act does not
affect present laws which prohibit candidates for federal political
office from soliciting or receiving contributions from federal em-
ployees for political purposes 42 and prohibit federal employees
from running for partisan office or participating in the campaign of
another partisan candidate, except in specified communities where
federal employees constitute the largest group of citizens. 43 How-
ever, political action committees are not prohibited from soliciting
contributions from federal employees. A rumor that the "boss"
expects employees to do their duty to the party may cause am-
bitious government employees, particularly those who are mem-
bers of the party in power, to contribute. 44
36 Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, § 302(c), 43 Stat. 1070.





The relevant provisions of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, § 309,
43 Stat. 1073, placed limitations only on the expenditures of Senate and House candidates.40 
d.
41 Election Act § 202.
42 18 U.S.C. § 602 (1970); 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7325 (1970).
45 U.S.C. §§ 7323-7327 (1970); 5 C.F.R. §§ 733, 122-124(1971).
" Lobel recognizes the complaints that have been made against the absolute prohibition
of political contributions to specified federal officials by federal employees, 18 U.S.C.
WINTER 19721
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3. Limitations on the Communications Media-The Act pro-
vides that broadcasters may not charge political candidates more
than the lowest unit cost for the same advertising time charged to
commercial advertisers and that non-broadcast media may not
charge political candidates more than the comparable amounts
charged to commercial advertisers for the same class and amount
of advertising space. This requirement applies only during a for-
ty-five day period preceding primary elections and a sixty day
period preceding general elections.4
5
The most significant law dealing with equality of opportunity
for candidates to present themselves and their ideas to the elec-
torate is section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934,46 which
provides that if a broadcaster grants the use of broadcasting
facilities to a candidate for political purposes, equal opportunities,
including equal time, must be granted to all candidates for the
same office.4 7 An important supplement to the equal opportunities
doctrine is the fairness doctrine, which requires that if a broad-
caster presents one side of a controversial issue of public impor-
tance, he must grant reasonable time to an appropriate spokesman
to present the other point of view.48 Ironically, the Senate version
of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 excepted federal
elective offices from the equal opportunities doctrine; 49 however,
the bill as finally enacted does not modify the doctrine.
4. Reporting Requirements; Administration -The Act requires
that candidates, individuals and political action committees keep
financial records and report each contribution, loan or expenditure
in excess of $100, as well as total receipts, loans and ex-
penditures.
50
Although the Senate bill proposed that the Act be administered
by a six-member Federal Elections Commission, 51 the final enact-
ment provides for the division of administrative responsibilities.
The Secretary of the Senate will serve as the supervisory officer
for Senatorial campaigns, the Clerk of the House will serve as the
administrator for campaigns for the House of Representatives,
§ 607 (1970), and suggests that a $100 contribution to local and state campaigns be
allowed. Lobel, supra note 20, at 27-28.
45 Election Act § 103.
4647 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).
47 A comprehensive analysis of the equal opportunities doctrine is contained in Barrow,
The Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting: Pillars in the Form of
Democracy, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 447 (1968).
48 Id.
49S. 382, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 1(a) (1971).
50 Election Act§§ 304-305.
51S. 382, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 310 (1971).
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and the Comptroller-General will serve as the administrator for
other federal elective offices.
52
B. Revenue Act of 1971
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966 pro-
vided that individuals making a federal income tax return could
designate that $1 of the tax should be paid to the Presidential
Election Campaign Fund. 53 The statute provided a formula of
support which was the same for the two major parties but sub-
stantially larger than the support available to third parties. 54 The
statute was not to become effective until guidelines were adopted
governing the distribution of the funds.5 5 These guidelines were
never enacted, the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of
1966 was never activated, and the Act was repealed by the
Revenue Act of 1971.56 Had the statute been put into effect for
the 1972 presidential campaign, the Democrats and Republicans
would have been eligible to receive $29 million each, and the
American Independent Party would have been eligible for ap-
proximately $5 million. 57 Since the statute required a popular vote
of at least five million in the preceding presidential election in
order to be eligible to receive a subsidy from the fund, 58 no other
party would have qualified.
Sections 801 and 802 of the Revenue Act of 1971, the Presi-
dential Election Campaign Fund Act,59 contain provisions for
support of presidential campaigns similar to the repealed Presi-
dential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966. Section 802 pro-
vides that taxpayers may designate that $ 1 of their taxes be paid
to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund for allocation to the
party of the taxpayer's choice or to a non-partisan account. How-
ever, if the taxpayer does not make any designation; partisan or
non-partisan, no part of the taxpayer's payment will be placed in
the fund. If the total amount designated for a specific party is
insufficient to pay the sum for which the party qualifies, an
52 Election Act § 301(g).
5 Act of Nov. 13, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-806, § 302(a), 80 Stat. 1587.
54 1d. § 303, 80 Stat. 1588.
55 Act of June 13, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-26, § 5, 81 Stat. 58.
56 11 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1, 100 (1971).
57 These data are obtained by applying the statutory formula set forth in Pub. L. No.
89-809, § 303, 80 Stat. 1588, to the popular vote in the presidential election of 1968, in
which the Republicans received 31,785,480, the Democrats 31,275,473 and the American
Independents 9,906,473 votes. All other parties received a total popular vote of only
244,444 votes. NEW YORK TIMES ENCYCLOPEDIA ALMANAC 148 (197 1).
58 Act of Nov. 13, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, § 303(c), 80 Stat. 1588.
59 II U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 87-100 (1971).
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amount will be allocated from the non-partisan account to make
up the deficiency. If the non-partisan account lacks sufficient
funds to make up the deficiency, the party is permitted to accept
sufficient contributions from other sources to make up the defi-
ciency, but no more. A party may elect not to accept the support
provided by the statute, in which event the party is not limited to
the maximum expenditure limitation of this statute. However, if a
party elects to accept the support, it must limit its expenditures to
the sum for which it is eligible under the statute.
The sum allocable under the statute is computed as follows.
Major parties, those which received 25 percent or more of the
popular vote in the preceding presidential election, are entitled to
a sum equal to fifteen cents multiplied by the number of residents
in the United States who were eighteen years of age or older on
June 1 of the year preceding the year in which the presidential
election is held. Minor parties, those which received more than 5
percent but less than 25 percent of the popular vote in the preced-
ing presidential election, are eligible to receive an amount deter-
mined by the percentage of the average major party's vote repre-
sented by the vote for the minor party in the same preceding
election. Thus, major and minor parties receive an allotment prior
to each election based on their performance in the election four
years earlier. On the other hand, a new party is given an allotment
after each election in which it receives a certain statutory min-
imum vote. If a new party obtains more than 5 percent of the
popular vote in a current presidential election, it will be reim-
bursed in an amount equal to the allotment of a major party,
multiplied by the ratio of the number of popular votes received by
the new party's candidate to the average of the number of votes
received by major party candidates.
As drafted, the statute contemplated that the funds to support
presidential campaigns would be allocated in the election of 1972.
However, President Nixon stated categorically that the Revenue
Act of 1971 would be vetoed if the support were applied to the
presidential election of 1972, when presumably President Nixon
will be the Republican candidate for President. Accordingly, the
conferees of the Senate and House agreed to postpone application
of the support provisions until the presidential election of 1976.60
A further reservation raises a question as to whether enactment
of the new Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act has any
practical significance. As originally drawn, amounts checked off
6 0 Id. at 99.
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by taxpayers were to be appropriated automatically to the Presi-
dential Election Campaign Fund. However, the conferees of the
Senate and House agreed that the payments into the fund would
be made only by appropriation acts.61 A similar reservation in the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966 resulted in that
statute never being put into effect. It would not be surprising if the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1971 meets the same
fate.
The Revenue Act of 1971 also provides a tax incentive for
contributions to candidates for public office. Section 701 of the
Act gives taxpayers the alternative of a tax credit of $12.50 ($25
for married persons filing jointly), or a deducation from gross in-
come of $50 ($100 for married persons filing jointly) for political
contributions in a federal, state, local, primary, general or special
election. 62 The credit or deduction applies only to political contri-
butions made in 1972 and subsequent years.
63
C. Postscript
While the enforcement of laws regulating campaign financing is
difficult, actions have been brought against corporations and labor
organizations for violation of prior laws prohibiting them from
making contributions or expenditures for political purposes.
6 4
Nevertheless, loopholes in pre-1971 statutes and the failure of
Congress to invoke the Presidential Campaign Fund Act of 1966
rendered ineffective the attempts to control unfair practices. By
enacting the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the
provisions of the Revenue Act of 1971, Congress has made a
renewed commitment to electoral reform.
Complementing the federal legislation are several state statutes
regulating expenditures in political campaigns for state and local
offices. For example, a majority of states have enacted corrupt
practices statutes which prohibit corporations from making contri-
butions or expenditures for political purposes in state and local
elections0 5 While an analysis of state laws is beyond the scope of
this article, state legislation provides a helpful background for
programming a system of federal regulation of campaign spend-
ing.66
61 Id. at 92.
62 Id. at 84-86.
6a Id. at 86.
64 H. ALEXANDER, supra note 5. at 199- 200. 208.
65 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 671 (McKinney 1967); Rice, supra note 25, at 721-23.
66 For an analysis ot the state approaches, see H. ALEXANDER, REGULATION OF POLITI-
CAL FINANCE (1966).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY REGULATION
OF CAMPAIGN FUNDING AND SPENDING
Regulation of campaign funding and spending involves a bal-
ancing of society's interest in a workable and fair election process
with the individual citizen's freedom of speech and assembly in
the important area of political expression. 67 The conflict of these
interests, which are at the peak of our scale of societal values,
raises serious constitutional issues. Reasonable regulation of cam-
paign funding and spending, to enable candidates to present them-
selves and their ideas to the people, to prevent excessive influence
on the election by the wealthy or other special interests, and to
instill confidence of the electorate in our election process,
68
should withstand attack by those who charge that such regulation
is unconstitutional. However, it is important that such regulations
not unduly restrict any citizen's opportunity to participate in the
election process.
A. Congressional Power to Regulate Federal
Election Campaigns
The constitutional basis for congressional regulation of cam-
paign funding and spending in federal elections is clearer in the
case of congressional elections than of presidential elections. Ar-
ticle I, section 4 expressly authorizes Congress to make law, or
alter state law, governing the "Times, Places and Manner" of
holding elections for Senators and Representatives. In Smiley v.
Holm,6 9 the Supreme Court, in dictum now unquestioned, stated
that this authorization includes the "authority to provide a com-
plete code for congressional elections" including "corrupt prac-
tices."'70 As to presidential elections, Article II, section 1 leaves
the manner of appointment of electors to the states and empowers
Congress to determine "the Time of chusing the Electors and the
Day on which they shall give their Votes."
There are several other probable sources of constitutional pow-
er to regulate presidential and congressional elections: the neces-
sary and proper clause, the commerce clause, and the power of
Congress to make laws implementing section 1 of the fourteenth
67 For an analysis of the constitutional issues, see A. ROSENTHAL, THE GREENING OF
AMERICAN ELECTIONS: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE REGU-
LATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE. An amplification of this mimeographed 88 page paper
will be published early in 1972 by Citizens' Research Foundation, Princeton, New Jersey.
Citations in this article are to the mimeographed paper.
68 See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
69 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
70 Id. at 366.
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amendment which prohibits the states from abridging privileges of
citizens and denying due process and equal protection. 71 Since
election to federal office has become a business with contribu-
tions, goods and services in the campaign flowing across state
lines, the flexible commerce clause might well be stretched to
cover business related to elections. The power conferred by the
Constitution on the states to make laws governing the election of
Presidential Electors and Congressmen provides a basis for in-
vocation of the fourteenth amendment to review state action.
72
Notwithstanding the foregoing authority, the Supreme Court
appears to have based its decisions sustaining the regulation of
presidential elections on inherent power of sovereignty. In Ex
Parte Yarbrough,73 involving intimidation of Negro voters in an
election for Congress, the Supreme Court, in upholding a statute
applying to both presidential and congressional elections, stated:
That a government whose essential character is republican,
whose executive head and legislative body are both elec-
tive ... has no power by appropriate laws to secure this
election from the influence of violence, of corruption, and of
fraud, is a proposition so startling as to arrest attention.... It
is essential to the successful workings of this government that
the great organisms of its executive and legislative branches
should be the free choice of the people .... 74
Again, in Burroughs v. United States,75 where the requirement in
the old Federal Corrupt Practices Act that political action com-
mittees report contributions and expenditures in presidential cam-
paigns was held constitutional, the Supreme Court stated:
To say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate
legislation to safeguard [a presidential] election from the im-
proper use of money to influence the result is to deny to the
nation in a vital particular the power of self protection. Con-
gress, undoubtedly possesses that power .... 76
This inherent power of sovereignty would seem to provide ample
basis for reasonable regulation of federal elections.
In Burroughs, the Supreme Court further indicated that Con-
gress would not be held to a stricter test of reasonableness in
choosing the means of regulating federal elections than is applied
71 A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 67, at I 1- 12.
72Williams v. Rhodes. 393 U.S. 23 (1968): Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966): cf. Oregon v. Mitchell. 400 U.S. 112 (1970): A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 67, at
18-20.
73 110 U.S. 65 (1884).
74 Id. at 657. 666.
75 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
76 Id. at 545.
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in reviewing the work of the Congress in other areas. The Court
stated:
The power of Congress to protect the election of President
and Vice-President being clear, the choice of means to that
end presents a question primarily addressed to the judgment
of Congress. If it can be seen that the means adopted are
really calculated to attain the end, the degree of their necessi-
ty, the extent to which they conduce to the end, the closeness
of the relationship of the means adopted and the end to be
attained, are matters for congressional determination alone.
77
Yet, it would not be surprising to find the Supreme Court, in the
context of an unduly severe limitation upon contributions or ex-
penditures, repeating a statement it made in a case not involving
regulation of corrupt political practices, Shelton v. Tucker:
78
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even
though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substan-
tial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can more
narrowly be achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment
must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving
the same basic purpose. 79
The power to regulate primary elections should be identical
with the power to regulate general elections. In Newberry v.
United States,80 the Supreme Court held that primaries are not
elections but merely a method of agreeing on candidates. This is
an unsound result; if primaries cannot be regulated to prevent
corruption, in the general election the electorate may be limited to
a Hobson's choice between two candidates corruptly chosen. The
Supreme Court, in the later case of United States v. Classic,
8 1
upheld a conviction for falsely reporting the count of ballots in a
primary. At the same time, the Court held that a primary was a
part of the election process contemplated by the Constitution.
Classic implicitly overrules Newberry, and Congress today prob-
ably would be held to have the power to enact corrupt practices
legislation applicable to primaries.
B. Limitations upon Contribution and Expenditures
Heard has described the evolution of American political cam-
77 Id. at 547-48.
78 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
T9Id. at 488.
80256 U.S. 232 (1921).
81 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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paign methods through five stages: the initial period of limited
public campaigning, the torchlight era commencing with Jackson,
large scale use of campaign literature beginning in 1880, radio
campaigning from 1928, and dominance of television campaigning
from 1952 to date.8 2 In assessing the legality of regulating cam-
paign funding and spending, it is important to take into account
the current methods of campaign spending and the financial re-
quirement of an effective campaign.
As shown in part I of this article, the major types of regulation
of campaign funding and spending include limitations upon the
political expenditures of corporations and labor unions. There is a
dearth of Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of
legislation of this nature. Probably this is because loopholes in the
statutes alleviated the incentive to test the legislation's validity.
Yet, the long history of acceptance of the regulatory statutes
tends to support their constitutionality.
1. Limitations on Expenditures by a Candidate from His Own
Resources -If the limitation on the amount which a candidate
may expend from his own resources were set so low that he could
not present himself and his ideas to the electorate, this might well
constitute an unreasonable restraint on freedom of speech. On the
other hand, the purpose of limiting the size of expenditures is to
prevent the wealthy candidate from having an undue advantage in
elections.
A distinction could be made between expenditures of one's
own money and expenditures of money donated by others. Cer-
tainly a candidate should be protected by the first amendment in
spending his own money to make as many speeches as he can
make. But if a candidate is using the money of others to fund his
speeches, or if he is using either his own money or money contrib-
uted by others to induce others to make speeches in his behalf, his
first amendment interest is not as strong. Nevertheless, legislation
regulating campaign expenditure from a candidate's own re-
sources should not set limits so low that the statute increases the
natural advantage of incumbents.
8 3
To the extent that the wealthy candidate is allowed an undue
advantage, money is a pollutant in the election and the practice is
corrupt. If the limitation does not prevent the availability of
82 A. HEARD, supra note 3, at 400- 28.
83 The unprecedented amount of time that Prsident Nixon requested and received to
report to the people on controversial issues such as the Vietnam War, economic controls,
and the like has prompted many requests, based on the fairness doctrine, by spokesmen for
the Democratic Party for reasonable time to present the opposing viewpoint. Most of these
requests have been denied. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 40 U.S.L.W. 2488
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 2, 1972).
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adequate funds to support fair and honest elections, limitations on
size of expenditures by candidates to prevent disparate influence
on the election would be constitutional. This is consistent with the
one man, one vote principle in reapportionment cases and other
Supreme Court decisions holding that financial or property quali-
fications for voting deny equal protection of the law.
8 4
2. Limitations on Corporations, Labor Unions, and Federal
Employees-There is limited authority by the Supreme Court on
the constitutionality of legislation limiting campaign contributions
and expenditures by source. All corporations are prohibited from
contributing or spending money in federal elections."5 In fact,
corporations were the first entities to be excluded from the elec-
tion process. Since the exclusion is total, it is surprising that there
is no Supreme Court case on the constitutionality of the legisla-
tion. Apparently some corporate managers accepted the concept
that corporate funds should not be used to support parties or
candidates opposed by some members of a pluralistic group of
shareholders, while other corporations used the available loop-
holes.8
6
The prohibition against labor organizations making contribu-
tions or expenditures in federal political campaigns8 7 was first
tested in United States v. C10.8 3 The union supported a candi-
date for Congress in a union newspaper which was published with
union funds and distributed solely to union members. To avoid
the first amendment issue, the Supreme Court held that the word
"expenditure," as used in the statute, was not intended by Con-
gress to apply to a union newspaper distributed solely to union
members and not to the general public.8 9 Later, in United States
v. Auto Workers Union,90 the Supreme Court upheld an in-
84 Notes I and 2 supra.
85 Notes 20 and 22 supra and accompanying text.
8 Notes 27 and 28 supra and accompanying text. In United States v. Lewis Food Co.,
366 F.2d 710 (9th Cir., 1966), the corporation published in 35 newspapers the voting
record of all California legislators on "constitutional principles." The court of appeals
reversed the district court's dismissal of the indictment and held that whether the adver-
tisement was designed to influence the public at large to vote for particular candidates was
a jury question.
87 Notes 21 and 22 supra and accompanying text.
88 335 U.S. 106 (1948). The author of this article was one of the Govcrnment's counsel
in this litigation.
89 The legislative history is contrary to the Supreme Court's position. During the
debates, Senator Taft, who sponsored the Taft-Hartley Act in the Senate, was asked on
several occasions whether favoring a political candidate in a union newspaper came within
the ban of the statute and he always answered affirmatively and clearly. 93 CONG. REC.
6436-40, 6447 (1947). Also, in his veto message, President Truman gave as a reason for
vetoing the statute that it would "prevent the ordinary union newspaper from commenting
favorably or unfavorably upon candidates .. " 93 CONG. REC. 7488 (1947).
90 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
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dictment for using union funds to pay for a television broadcast
supporting certain candidates for federal office; however the con-
stitutional issue was held not ripe for adjudication. 9' In the opin-
ion, the Court explained that the "evil at which Congress has
struck ... is the use of corporate or union funds to influence the
public at large to vote for a particular candidate or a particular
party." 92 The dissent would have held, without remand, that the
union's expression of political views was protected by the first
amendment. 93 That the Supreme Court did not take advantage of
the opportunities in the above cases to decide the constitutional
issue, thereby leaving the statute operative, suggests that the
constitutionality of the statute in an appropriate case would be
sustained.
The Supreme Court has spoken clearly on the constitutionality
of legislation restraining the political activities of federal civil
service employees. 94 The Hatch Act95 prohibits federal civil ser-
vice employees from speaking or writing in support of a political
candidate. In United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell,96
this restraint was held constitutional:
The essential rights of the First Amendment in some in-
stances are subject to the elemental need for order without
which the guarantees of civil rights to others would be a
mockery.... Again this Court must balance the extent of the
guarantees of freedom against a congressional enactment to
protect a democratic society against the supposed evil of
political partisanship by classified employees of the govern-
ment .... The determination of the extent to which political
activities of governmental employees shall be regulated lies
primarily with Congress .... When actions of civil servants in
the judgment of Congress menace the integrity and the com-
petency of the service, legislation to forestall such danger and
adequate to maintain its usefulness is required. The Hatch
Act is the answer of Congress to this need. We cannot say
with such a background that these restrictions are uncon-
stitutional .97
In earlier cases, the Supreme Court had sustained statutes which
prohibited any federal employee from giving to or receiving from
91 Id. at 589-92.
92 Id. at 589.
93 Id. at 593.
94 For a description of this legislation, see text accompanying note 43 supra.
9 5 U.S.C. §§ 7324-7327 (1970); 5 C.F.R. §§ 733, 122- 124 (1971).
96 330 U.S. 75 (1947). A companion case in which the political activity was presiding
over a fund raising dinner is Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
97 Id. at 95-96. 102.
WINTER 1972]
Journal of Law Reform
any other federal employee a contribution for political purposes
and barred Congressmen from receiving political contributions
from federal employees. 98 The opinions in these cases emphasize
that the efficiency and integrity of the federal civil service would
be jeopardized if federal employees could be pressed into political
service or rewarded on the basis of such service. These consid-
erations underlie the establishment of the merit system of appoint-
ing federal employees. Nevertheless, although held constitutional
in Mitchell, prohibiting all participation in a political campaign
raises a much stronger first amendment issue than merely prohib-
iting contributions for political purposes. 99
3. Reporting Requirements-In general, the 1971 Act requires
that candidates and those acting in their behalf report total
receipts, loans and expenditures as well as each contribution, loan
and expenditure in excess of $100.100 In Burroughs v. United
States,1° 1 the Supreme Court held that Congress had the power to
legislate in the area of disclosure of political contributions, al-
though first amendment issues were not raised. It is certainly true,
however, that requiring the reporting of the source of small contri-
butions and thereby disclosing one's political affiliation or support
of a particular candidate or issue might lead in some circum-
stances to reprisal by an employer or an impairment of the rela-
tionship with one's associates. Also, there is less reason to require
reporting of small contributions that do not give the donor signifi-
cant influence over the elected official. So in some contexts in-
volving sensitive areas of privacy and personal relationships, re-
porting of only the aggregate of small contributions, without the
individual sources, may fulfill the purposes of a corrupt practice
statute without causing constitutional problems.
10 2
Since the new legislation excepts from the reporting require-
ments those contributions under $100, the basis for constitutional
challenge is weaker than under prior law.10 3 Nevertheless, a $100
9 8 Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396
(1930). In these cases the only issue considered by the Supreme Court was the power of
Congress to legislate in the area. The first amendment issue was not raised.
99 A. ROSENTAHL, supra note 67, at 40 n. 60.
100 Election Act §§ 302-305.
101 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
102 A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 67, at 62-68; see Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60
(1960), invalidating an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of handbills not carrying the
name and address of the sponsor because it was reasonable to suppose that there would be
reprisal against the sponsor. However, handbills have traditionally received strong first
amendment protection, and it is possible that Talley will be limited to the handbill context.
103 Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, §§ 302- 308, 43 Stat. 1070.
Under prior law, candidates, political action committees, and other individuals partici-
pating in federal election campaigns had to maintain records of receipts and expenditures
and file reports with the Senate or House. However, candidates for President and
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contribution is unlikely to give the donor significant influence over
the elected officials; indeed, the minimum contribution which
must be reported could arguably be substantially higher without
jeopardizing the purposes of the disclosure requirement.
C. Limitations upon Use of the
Communications Media
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 places a limitation
on the amount which a candidate may spend on broadcasting for
political purposes. The Act imposes a maximum limitation upon
the amount which a candidate may spend for use of the commu-
nications media and then provides that no more than 60 percent of
that amount may be spent in the broadcast media. 104 A similar
provision was contained in a bill passed by Congress in 1970 and
vetoed by President Nixon. 10 5 In light of the cases upholding
regulation of campaign expenditures, 0 6 the extensive regulation
of broadcasting which already exists, and the unique impact of
broadcasting on political campaigns, there is little doubt that the
limitation on the amount which can be spent on broadcasting for
political purposes would, if challenged, be held constitutional.
The broadcasting industry has taken the position that any limi-
tation on the amount which may be spent on use of media for
political purposes should apply to all media, rather than solely to
broadcasting, and that the candidate should be free to choose the
manner in which the permitted sum is to be allocated among the
media. 10 7 Regulation of the sum which a candidate may spend on
broadcasting without extending the limitation to newspapers,
magazines and other media may conceivably raise an issue under
the fifth amendment of unequal protection of the laws.' 08 How-
ever, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the Congress
can strike first at the greatest evil without treating simultaneously
all degrees of harmful action.' 0 9 In political campaigning, this is
the age of television and the impact on the electorate of personal
appearance on television and the dramatic advertisements devised
Vice-President, intrastate committees, and individuals making only intrastate expenditures
were excepted from the reporting requirements. Also, the reporting requirements did not
apply to primaries.
104 Election Act § 104(a)(1)(B).
105 The veto message is reported in 116 CONG. REC. S. 18724 (1970).
106 See text accompanying notes 85-99 supra.
107 Senate Hearings 381 (statement of Dr. Frank Stanton, President of CBS), at 410
(statement of Julian Goodman, President of NBC), and at 420 (statement of Leonard H.
Goldenson, President of ABC). The three network presidents took the same position.
108 See text accompanying notes 130- 134 infra
109 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
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by professionals give television a unique position. Hence, sepa-
rately classifying the broadcast media and limiting the sum which
may be spent for political broadcasts is reasonable. Radio has
much less impact than television. However, lumping radio with
television and making the limitation applicable to broadcasting
generally does not appear to raise any substantial issue of unrea-
sonableness of classification.
However, when Congress accepted the broadcasters' viewpoint
by establishing a limitation on the sum which candidates and
those acting in their behalf may spend on non-broadcast media for
political purposes and requiring a candidate to certify in writing
to a newspaper or magazine that applicable spending limitations
are not being violated, 110 it raised still another constitutional ques-
tion: does freedom of the press protect the print media from
statutory limitations on the use of the media for political pur-
poses? Broadcasting is a unique medium of communication. Ac-
cess to broadcasting is limited by nature. Broadcasters operate
their stations as licensees serving the public interest, and tele-
vision is unique both in its impact on the electorate and in the cost
of political campaigns. These characteristics of the broadcast
media obviously do not lend support to the constitutionality of
limitations on non-broadcast media. This is demonstrated by the
Supreme Court's opinion in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC,"' where the Court relied heavily upon the natural limita-
tions of the broadcast media-limitations admittedly not present
in the print media-to support the constitutionality of the fairness
doctrine in broadcasting. 1 2 If this distinction is significant in
determining the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine which
promotes use of the media for political purposes, it would appear
to be even more significant in determining the constitutionality of
a provision in the 1971 Act which limits use of the media for
political purposes.
1 13
'10 Election Act § 104(b).
"1 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
112 Id. at 386-90.
113 On the other hand, it has been noted that, while in a theoretical sense the print media
resource is unlimited, practically, however, the print media are limited. Monopoly in the
print media has been developing rapidly in recent years. In part, this is a product of the
competition between the broadcast media and the print media. In 1967, in the entire
United States, there were only sixty-four cities which had competing daily newspaper
ownerships; in seventeen states there were no competing daily newspapers in any city; in
only twenty-six states was there more than one city in which daily newspaper ownerships
competed; and in only three cities in the United States did more than two daily newspaper
ownerships compete. See B. RUCKER, THE FIRST FREEDOM (1968); reviewed by Barrow,
15 N.Y.L.F. 999 (1969).
In these circumstances, a reasonable case might be made for limiting the amount of
money which a candidate may spend on political advertising in newspapers, for making
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In considering the constitutionality of the limitation upon ex-
penditures for use of the broadcast media, it is essential to note
that the election process can be unduly influenced by unlimited
political advertisement in the print media, and to limit the use of
broadcasting alone would simply serve to divert funds to the print
media.
Even if the limitation of expenditures for political advertising in
the print media should be held unconstitutional, it should not
affect the validity of the limitation on use of broadcasting for
political purposes. Broadcasting holds a unique place and is dis-
tinguishable.
It has been suggested that "spot" political broadcasts, which
are too brief to present a political issue and are often used to draw
an image of the candidate which may be the opposite of his true
political character, should be prohibited. 114 Although there have
been attempts in recent elections to use such spot political an-
nouncements to influence voting on emotional rather than reason-
able bases, some candidates may be able to reach the electorate
only through spot broadcasts, and a candidate should be free to
choose that format which best suits his political style. Govern-
ment regulation, such as the equal opportunities and fairness
doctrines in broadcasting, that increases the opportunity to speak
in the exercise of self-government, implements the first amend-
ment. 1" 5 However, regulation which prohibits a form of speech,
such as a spot political broadcast, raises a serious constitutional
question. 11
6
D. Disparate Treatment of Major, Minor and New Parties
In a political campaign, a broadcaster who grants the use of a
station to a candidate for political purposes must grant equal
opportunity to opposing candidates. Outside the campaign con-
such limitation enforceable by requiring the newspaper to obtain the consent of the
candidate prior to carrying the political advertisement, and even for requiring that news-
papers give equal opportunity to opposing political candidates to place political advertise-
ments in the newspaper.
114 Senate Hearings 588-92.
115 Barrow, supra note 47, at 508-09. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine in broad-
casting), with Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 411 F.2d 289, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 844 (1966) (California's statute prohibiting pay television invalidated as
an abridgment of free speech).
116 See Mills v. Alabama. 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (statute that prohibited newspapers from
carrying in the election day issue editorials on issues being voted upon held uncon-
stitutional); Federal Communications Commission Memorandum of the General Counsel
on the Legality of Establishing Minimum Time Durations for Political Broadcasts, in
Senate Hearings 588-9 1.
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text, if an elected official or prospective candidate is granted time
on a station to discuss a controversial issue of public importance,
reasonable time must be granted to an appropriate spokesman for
the opposing point of view. 11 7 The constitutionality of such regu-
lation of broadcasting is well established." 8 Since licensees are
granted free use of the publicly-regulated broadcast channels for
profit, it is clear that Congress could require broadcasting stations
to grant free time to political candidates as a condition to award-
ing the use of the public channel." 9 Indeed, Congress could
establish "open mike" broadcasting, allocate particular channels
exclusively for political purposes, or license channels for partial
use by the broadcaster-the remainder of the time being reserved
for political purposes.' 20 The United States licenses the airwaves
for use by broadcasters who are under a duty to serve the public
interest.
Television is the paramount medium for conducting political
campaigns today, and it has a unique impact on the electorate.
The licensing and regulation of broadcasting gives government a
strong hand in the functions of broadcasters, and it may well be
that government cannot permit broadcasters to discriminate in
granting access to broadcasting for political purposes. 12' The Sen-
ate version of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 would
have repealed the equal time requirement of section 315 of the
Communications Act insofar as it applies to federal elective
office. a22 The Act as finally passed does not repeal the require-
ment. Although the Senate bill would have discouraged favoritism
by broadcasters in granting access to the station for political
purposes by making willful or repeated refusal of reasonable ac-
cess a ground for denial of a license to broadcast, 23 repeal of the
117 See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
118 Barrow, supra note 47, at 505-32: and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969).
119 Section 315 of the Communications Act requires that broadcasters which grant the
use of the station to a political candidate for political purposes must grant equal time to
opposing candidates. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970). Similarly, the FCC's rules applying the
fairness doctrine to political editorials and personal attacks require the broadcaster to grant
free time to reply. These requirements were held constitutional in Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
121 Barrow, supra note 47, at 512- 13.
121 Petition of Edmund G. Brown, Jr. to the Federal Communications Commission
Regarding Issuance of a Rule Requiring Television Licensees to Afford Reasonable
Opportunity to Legally Qualified Candidates for Statewide Public Office to Present their
Views on Issues of Public Importance, published in Hearings on H.R. 8627-28 Before the
Subcomm. on Communications and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., ser. 92- 18, at 119-36; A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 67, at
55-57: Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641, 1672-73 (1967): Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 878-86 (1963).
122S. 382, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 101(a)(197 1).
123 Id. § 101(c).
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equal time requirement would have raised a substantial con-
situtional issue. For years, there has been a strong campaign by
networks and broadcasters to repeal section 315. The reason
given is that networks and stations cannot sell time or grant free
time if the number of candidates for an office is large and all are
entitled to equal time.124 This suggests that if section 3 15 is ever
repealed, it is unlikely that broadcasters can be counted upon to
provide a practical opportunity for new parties to emerge and
minor parties to challenge the major parties in elections. If such a
practical opportunity is not provided, issues of denial of freedom
of speech and assembly for political purposes and denial of equal
protection of the laws would arise.
In 1968, the author of this article proposed a differential equal-
ity of access approach to regulation of the use of broadcasting for
political purposes. 125 Candidates were classified major, minor or
evolving, depending upon support by the electorate as evidenced
by the vote for their party in the preceding campaign or by
petitions: a major party was one that received three percent of the
popular vote; a minor party was one that received one percent of
the popular vote or obtained signatures of one-half percent of per-
sons of voting age, and an evolving party was any other party or
candidate. The proposal called for the grant of free prime time for
campaign purposes during the eight weeks preceding the election.
Both as to free time and purchased time, the differential was as
follows. Major candidates were accorded equal time as between
members of the class, half time being granted to minor candidates
but no time required to be given to evolving candidates. If a
broadcaster gave a minor candidate time, other minor candidates
were accorded equal time, half time being granted to major candi-
dates, but no time being required to be given to evolving candi-
dates. The broadcaster could grant time to an evolving candidate
without being required to grant any time to major or minor candi-
dates. For example the broadcaster could use the panel format for
evolving candidates, which makes the accommodation of substan-
tial numbers of candidates practical. In 1969, the Twentieth Cen-
tury Fund Commission on Campaign Costs in the Electronic Era
adopted a similar proposal.' 26
It is essential in a representative democracy that all serious
124 Barrow, supra note 47, at 480- 84.
125 Id. at 533-42. For a favorable analysis of the proposal, see Alexander, Commu-
nications and Politics: the Media and the Message, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 255,
274-75 (1969).
126 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, VOTERS' TIME, REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN COSTS IN THE ELECTRONIC ERA, at 20-27
(1971). The Commission was chaired by Newton N. Minow, former chairman of the FCC.
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candidates have an opportunity to present themselves and their
ideas and that the electorate have an opportunity to see and to
hear the candidates. Whether governmental assistance be in the
form of a grant of campaign funds or grant of free time on
broadcasting stations or both, the problem of giving the electorate
an opportunity to evaluate the serious candidates will be aggra-
vated by a great increase in the number of nominal candidates. It
is not practical to treat every nominal candidate equally; to at-
tempt this would simply deny the electorate an opportunity to
reach a sound judgment on the serious candidates. It is necessary
to balance the electorate's interest in a viable election process
against the right of individual candidates and their supporters,
however small, to engage in the election process. If government
regulates access to television for political purposes or campaign
funding in a manner which assists, rather than restrains, new
parties and evolving candidates, while providing such greater as-
sistance to established parties as may be necessary to give the
electorate a reasonable opportunity to evaluate the candidates and
platforms, the disparity should withstand constitutional attack.
However, if government so favors the major parties that minor
parties have no reasonable opportunity to grow and to compete,
and the new parties have no opportunity to evolve, then such
control would be unconstitutional. The analytic approaches to this
constitutional problem, based upon the first amendment and equal
protection, will now be considered.
At first blush, it may seem that so long as government grants
some assistance to a minor or new party, there are no issues of
freedom of speech or assembly even though major parties are
granted greater assistance. However, by regulating access to the
broadcast media, by requiring that candidates be given free tele-
vision time and grants of campaign funds, or by collecting and
allocating taxes designated by the taxpayer for support of the
election process, government can affect substantially the oppor-
tunity of candidates to communicate with the electorate. To the
extent that government favors some candidates and parties over
others, government limits the opportunity of the less favored to
compete for the eye and ear of the electorate.
The Red Lion case, which upheld the fairness doctrine in
broadcasting against attack on first amendment grounds, empha-
sized that
[iut is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount.... It is the purpose of the
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
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ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to
countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by
Government itself or a private licensee .... "[S]peech con-
cerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government." . . . That right may not be con-
stitutionally abridged either by Congress or by the FCC. 12
7
In testing the constitutionality of governmental support of the
election process, the Supreme Court will likely take this first
amendment approach. Indeed, in later cases involving the regu-
lation of the election process, the Supreme Court has focused
upon the balancing of the power of Congress to protect the
integrity of the election process and the impingement of regulation
on first amendment rights.'
2 8
In the case of state statutes which favor some political parties
over others, the Supreme Court has followed an equal protection
approach in testing constitutionality. In Williams v. Rhodes,12 9
the Supreme Court held that state legislation which gives the two
major parties an advantage over minor parties in getting candi-
dates on the ballot violates equal protection of the laws guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment. However, the Court observed
that the infringement also violated the first amendment right of
association which is protected by the fourteenth amendment from
encroachment by the states.'30 Through reverse incorporation of
the fourteenth amendment into the fifth amendment, other appli-
cations of the equal protection clause could be applied to dis-
parate treatment by the Congress of political parties and candi-
dates in federal elections. Reverse incorporation was practiced in
Boiling v. Sharpe,131 a companion case to Brown v. Board of
Education.132 In Brown, the Supreme Court held racial segrega-
tion in state public education an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment. In Boi-
ling, the Supreme Court held that racial segregation in the public
schools of the District of Columbia denied Blacks due process
guaranteed by the fifth amendment. The Court explained:
127 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
12 8 See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948), discussed in text accompanying
notes 88 and 89 supra (first amendment issue carefully avoided); United States v. Auto
Workers Union, 352 U.S. 567 (1957), discussed in text accompanying notes 90-93 supra
(majority avoided the first amendment issue but the dissent would have met it); and United
Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), discussed in text accom-
panying notes 94-99 supra (first amendment issue was a major one).
129393 U.S. 23 (1968).
1
3 0 1 d. at 30- 3 1.
131 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
132 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the
states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would im-
pose a lesser duty on the Federal Government. We hold that
racial segregation in the public schools of the District of
Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
133
Whether state legislation denies equal protection has usually been
tested by the standard that the classification must be "rationally
based and free from invidious discrimination. 1 13 4 However, the
Supreme Court has indicated that in some areas, such as political
activity, a narrower test would be used:
It is true that this Court has established the principle that the
Equal Protection Clause does not make every minor
difference in the application of laws to different groups a
violation of our Constitution. But we have also held many
times that "invidious" distinctions cannot be enacted without
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In determining
whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection
Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind
the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting,
and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the
classification. In the present situation the state laws place
burdens on two different, although overlapping, kinds of
rights-the right of individuals to associate for the advance-
ment of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters,
regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes
effectively. Both of these rights, of course, rank among our
most precious freedoms.
1 3 5
Whether the first amendment or equal protection of the laws
analysis is used, certain conclusions can be drawn. If government
through subsidy, tax incentive, or regulation of access to broad-
casting for political purposes, favors major parties over minor and
new parties, such governmental action may be unconstitutional
unless the disparity achieves a reasonable balance between the
133 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). Compare Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 35-36 (1948)
(courts of the District of Columbia not permitted to enforce racial covenants restricting the
conveyance of real estate to Blacks), with Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948) (state
courts not permitted to enforce racial covenants because of the equal protection clause).
See also Richardson v. Belcher, 401 U.S. 935 (1971), in which a federal statute reducing
the social security benefits by the amount of workmen's compensation provided by state
law was upheld, the Supreme Court observing that a classification which meets the equal
protection of the laws standard of the fourteenth amendment "is perforce consistent with
the due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 257.
134 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
135 Id.
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need of the electorate to have access to serious candidates and the
need for new parties to emerge and minor parties to have an
opportunity to compete with major parties. If the amount of
assistance granted minor and new parties is so small in com-
parison with that granted to major parties that the minor and new
parties cannot grow and compete, freedom of speech and assem-
bly for political purposes is inhibited. Finally, if the floor for
qualifying for governmental assistance is set so high that minor
and new parties are effectively excluded from the assistance
granted to major parties, the restraint on participation in represen-
tative democracy may run afoul of the Constitution.
E. Governmental Subsidies and Tax Incentives
Governmental subsidy of elections and other incentives have
been proposed for many years.13 6 The proposals have taken the
form of direct government subsidy, free use of the mails and
broadcast media, and tax incentives. The simplest way to assure
sufficient funds to sustain a meaningful political dialogue and
avoid undue influence by the wealthy or other special interests
would be for government to provide the necessary funds and to
prohibit private contributions. This was proposed by President
Theodore Roosevelt, and other high officials have repeated the
suggestion.'3 7 Puerto Rico subsidizes elections, but the legality of
the program has not been tested.138 A direct subsidy of elections
in Colorado was held unconstitutional, although the Colorado
Supreme Court did not write an opinion. 3 9 Also, a direct subsidy
in Massachusetts was invalidated on the unsound ground that
expenditure of state funds by political parties or candidates is not
a public purpose. 140 The amount of the subsidy in the Massachu-
setts case was based upon the vote received by each party in the
preceding election. Since the Democratic Party had received 80
percent of the vote, one party would have received 80 percent of
the subsidy. Such disparate governmental treatment would tend to
establish one dominant political party, and would clearly violate
the equal protection clause in light of the later Supreme Court
decision in Williams v. Rhodes.'41 On the other hand, a govern-
136 For a history of the effort to secure subsidization of the election process in the
United States, see A. HEARD, supra note 3, at 431-54; Lobel, supra note 20, at 57-60.
137 A. HEARD, supra note 3, at 43 1.
138 H. WELLS, GOVERNMENT FINANCING OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN PUERTO Rico
(1961).
139 People v. Galligan, No. 7323, Colorado Supreme Court, October 10, 1910.
140 Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. 800, 197 N.E.2d 691 (1964).
141 393 U.S. 23 (1968), discussed in text accompanying notes 128- 134 supra.
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mental subsidy of political elections based upon the voter support
of the party or candidate and reasonably graduated so as to assure
opportunity for new parties to emerge, minor parties to compete,
and major parties to present their platforms and candidates to the
electorate should be constitutional.
142
It is important to note that the tax credit and deduction provi-
sions contained in the 1971 Revenue Act are not direct subsidies,
but tax incentives to encourage contributions to the election pro-
cess. 143 The taxpayer is permitted to take a tax credit or a deduc-
tion from taxable income in a limited amount for political contri-
butions. The practice of permitting tax credits and deductions
from taxable income for public interest reasons is well estab-
lished. Well-known examples are contributions to charitable and
religious organizations, state and local taxes, and petroleum and
natural mineral deposits depletion. Minnesota and California have
enacted similar statutes permitting deduction of political contribu-
tions from taxable income for state income tax purposes.
144
A closer question arises with regard to sections 801 and 802 of
the Revenue Act of 1971, the new Presidential Election Cam-
paign Fund Act. This statute provides that the taxpayer may
designate that one of his tax dollars shall be paid into the fund for
distribution to the party of his choice. 145 If the taxpayer desig-
nates the party, the transaction may be equated with a tax credit.
However, if the designation is to the nonpartisan account and the
administrator of the fund allocates the contribution to the party
which has a deficiency in the amount for which it qualifies, the
transaction approximates a direct subsidy by government. Never-
theless, designation of the nonpartisan account should pass the
test of constitutionality. The purpose of the legislation is to en-
courage citizens of relatively small means to support representa-
tive democracy. The interest of the citizen in his government and
its integrity is likely to grow when he contributes to the election
process. Moreover, encouraging many small contributions re-
duces the need for large ones and thus ameliorates the influence of
large contributions on the political process.
One of the most difficult constitutional issues raised by the new
tax incentive and allocation provisions is the favorable treatment
of the two major parties vis-a-vis a third party and the relatively
142 Lobel, supra note 20, at 57-6 1, concludes that a governmental subsidy may be the
only effective way to render political parties a representative instrument of democracy.
143 For a discussion of these provisions, see text accompanying notes 62 and 63 supra.
144 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.21 (Supp. 1971); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17234 (West
1970); A. HEARD, supra note 3, at 445.
14 For a discussion of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, see text accom-
panying notes 59-61 supra.
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high popular vote which a new party must attract in order to
qualify for a subsidy.1 46 The allocation formula is drawn in such a
way that it is highly unlikely that more than two parties will
qualify as major, that is, receive 25 percent or more of the popular
vote, and that more than one party will qualify as minor, that is,
receive more than 5 percent of the vote. If the standard were
lowered to 3 percent of the popular vote to qualify as a major
party and 1 percent to qualify as a minor party, the results from
1944 through 1968 would have been as follows. There would
have been two major parties in all presidential elections, except in
1968, when the American Independent Party received approx-
imately 12 percent of the popular vote; and only three minor
parties, the American Labor Party in 1944 and the States Rights
Democratic Party and the Progressive Party in 1948. However,
under the standard used in the new statute, during the presidential
election years from 1944 through 1968, there would have been
only two major parties, the Democratic and Republican, and only
one minor party, the American Independent Party. It may well be
that the new statute so favors the two major parties and dis-
courages the entry of new parties that it offends the Constitution.
On the other hand, it is not feasible to treat established parties
and all new parties equally, for such a policy would generate a
plethora of splinter parties. However, a less rigorous test for
major, minor and new parties would have helped the legislation
pass the constitutional test.
IV. SUGGESTED CHANGES IN THE EXISTING
AND PROPOSED LAWS
The new Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act and the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 raise substantial con-
stitutional issues. This section suggests a few practical changes in
the legislation not only to insure their constitutionality, but also to
increase their effectiveness.
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act heavily favors
major parties-the Democratic and Republican Parties-over mi-
nor and new parties having relatively small voter support.1 47 The
practical effect of the Act is to assure that the Democratic and
Republican Parties have funds to conduct an adequate presiden-
tial election campaign, to limit the opportunity of minor parties to
compete with major parties, and to hinder the entry of new par-
146 Td.
147 The statute is described in the text accompanying notes 59- 6 1 supra.
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ties. New parties, recognizing the impracticality of mustering 5
percent of the popular vote, may not be inclined to run candidates
against candidates of major parties supported by large campaign
chests allocated by government from tax funds. On the basis of
presidential election history, a minor party which qualifies for
governmental support will attract little more than 5 percent of the
total popular vote and, thus, will qualify for only a small fraction
of the support granted to the two major parties.
The vulnerability of the statute to constitutional attack 148 could
be ameliorated by lowering the percentage of votes required for
new parties to receive assistance and increasing the amount grant-
ed to minor parties. Major party should be defined as a party
which attracted 5 percent or more of the popular vote in the
preceding presidential election, and minor party defined as one
which received at least 1 percent of the popular vote or, in the
case of new parties, obtained a comparable number of signatures
by persons of voting age. 149 A new party should be able to qualify
for assistance if it obtains signatures of persons of voting age on
petitions in a number which assures that the tax dollars earmarked
by that number of voters justify the cost of the identification and
accounting involved in administering the tax incentive program. A
new party which qualifies under this de minimis administrative
cost rule should receive all tax dollars designated for allocation to
the new party regardless of the number of votes which it ultimate-
148 The constitutional issue is discussed in the text accompanying note 145 supra. The
constitutional vulnerability of a statute, such as the Presidential Election Campaign Fund
Act, which favors the Democratic and Republican Parties over others has been empha-
sized by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Rhodes. The Court stated:
There is, of course, no reason why two parties should retain a permanent
monopoly on the right to have people vote for or against them. Competition
in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and
of the First Amendment Freedoms. New parties struggling for their place
must have the time and opportunity to organize in order to meet reasonable
requirements for ballot position, just as have the old parties in the past.
393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968). The relevance of this statement to a scheme of financial support of
elections which favors the Democratic and Republican Parties over other parties is
obvious.
149 Under the suggested definitions of major parties and minor parties, it is unlikely that
a large number of splinter parties would emerge. During the seven presidential elections
from 1944 through 1968, except for the Democratic and Republican Parties, there was
only one party in one election, the American Independent Party in 1968, which received
more than 5 percent of the popular vote. The tax incentive is some inducement to growth
of a third major party. However, that is unlikely if the Democratic and Republican Parties
offer meaningful alternatives to the electorate. A substantial third party emerges only in
periods when the two party system tends to become a Tweedledum-Tweedledee system.
But when this happens, it is important that a third party have the opportunity to compete.
If new parties not qualifying in the election as minor parties receive, as suggested above,
only those sums designated by taxpayers for the account of the new parties, no great
number of new parties will emerge because of the high cost of a nationwide political
campaign.
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ly musters in the presidential election. Also, if the new party
receives at least 1 percent of the popular vote in the election, it
should receive such additional sum as would equal the support
which it would have received if it had qualified as a minor party
prior to the election. Likewise, the amount of financial support to
minor parties should be greater than that provided in the statute.
The territorial dimensions of a presidential campaign require a
substantial campaign chest if the contest is to be more than a
campaign in name only. Accordingly, a minor party should re-
ceive no less than one-third of the sum granted to each major
party. Major parties, as the statute now provides, should receive
equal grants.
Neither the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act nor the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 provides for the grant of
free broadcast time for political purposes. The tax incentive pro-
vided in the Revenue Act of 1971 would be more effective if it
were supplemented with a statutory requirement that broadcasters
provide a reasonable *amount of free time during the eight weeks
preceding the presidential election. Such free time could be allo-
cated among candidates of major, minor and new parties in much
the way that the fund designated by taxpayers for political cam-
paigns is allocated. 150 In a free television time statute, differential
access standards would encourage new parties and give minor
parties an opportunity to compete with major parties.
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 leaves intact the
equal time requirement of section 315 of the Communications Act
of 1934. This requirement, with appropriate modification, is es-
sential to our political process. Television is the medium having
greatest impact on the election process, and broadcasters should
not be able to grant broadcast time to favored candidates and
deny time to their opponents. It is not sufficient, as the Senate
version of the Act would have provided, to consider in renewal
proceedings the willful and repeated denial of broadcast time to a
political candidate. 151 The FCC rarely denies a license for renew-
al and, even if it did, this would not right the wrong to the
defeated candidate who was denied access to broadcasting. More-
over, the equal time requirement, as presently applied, is in-
adequate in requiring that every nominal candidate, regardless of
voter support, be granted equal time. An amendment of section
3 15 providing differential equality of access to broadcasting, on
the basis of whether the candidate is major, minor or evolving,
150 See text accompanying notes 125 and 126 supra for one proposed plan.
151 The Senate bill and other aspects of the equal time requirement are discussed in the
text accompanying notes 120- 123 supra.
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would be more practical. Until this is done, the effort of the
television networks to repeal the equal time requirement will
continue.
The Federal Election Campaign Act raises a substantial con-
stitutional issue in that it limits the amount that can be spent for
political advertising in the print media and prohibits the print
media from printing a political advertisement without obtaining
the candidate's certification that payment will not violate any
spending limit. 152 The overall limitation upon expenditures for use
of the communications media would have been strengthened by
an exemption for small individual expenditures for advertisements
in newspapers. An individual expenditure of less than $100 by a
voter to express his view in a newspaper advertisement is unlikely
to result in the buying of elections. Also, if no more than a dozen
persons form an ad hoc committee, pool their contributions of not
more than $50 each, and purchase a political advertisement in a
newspaper, it is unlikely that the laudable purposes of the Federal
Election Campaign Act would be significantly undermined. Such a
modification in the statute would go far in solving the con-
stitutional problem by reserving a reasonable area for political
expression through the individual's choice of a newspaper adver-
tisement. Adoption of the suggested modifications would not re-
quire any change in the reporting requirements. Small sums ex-
pended under the suggested modifications would be in addition to
the maximum expenditure for political use of media now specified
in the statute.
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 removes the ceil-
ing on the amount which an individual or a political committee
could contribute to or spend in behalf of a candidate. A realistic
ceiling should have been retained. Merely limiting the amount
which the candidate can spend on use of communications media is
no substitute for a ceiling on individual or committee donations to
insure that federal elective officials do not fall under the domina-
tion of those persons or committees which provide most of the
financial support to the successful candidate.
The new legislation would have been more effective if a ceiling
on total campaign expenditures by all candidates for federal office
had been included. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
only limits the amount which can be spent for use of the commu-
nications media and the amount which a candidate or his family
152 Election Act §§ 104(a) and 104(b). For a discussion of the constitutional issues
involved in placing limitations upon the print media, see text accompanying notes 110- 113
supra.
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can contribute to his own campaign. There can be unlimited
expenditures by individuals and committees in conducting meet-
ings, getting out the vote, opening neighborhood campaign offices,
and other campaign activities. The value of a person's individual
activity in behalf of a candidate and the activity of small groups
should be excepted from any ceiling. But sums in excess of $ 100,
which must be reported under the new statute, should be included
in an over-all ceiling on campaign expenditures by candidates.
Although sections 801 and 802 of the Revenue Act of 1971,
the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, limit the total
expenditures in a presidential candidate's campaign to the amount
allocable to him from the fund created through the federal tax
system, the candidate may reject the allocation and thereby avoid
the statutory limitation. For example, a presidential candidate
whose party has many wealthy members may choose to reject any
allocation from the government campaign fund and proceed to
raise a campaign fund from private sources which is two or three
times the sum for which even the candidate of a major party can
qualify under the statute.
The statute leaves for future administrative action the impor-
tant problem of regulating loans for political purposes. 153 The
danger of subverting indebted elected officials and parties can be
avoided only by declaring by statute that loans for political pur-
poses are not legally collectible. They should be "gentlemen's
agreements." Meanwhile, the regulations to be promulgated by
the Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Communications Commis-
sion, and Interstate Commerce Commission, governing extension
of credit to political candidates, should be scrutinized closely.
154
The disclosure provisions of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971 appear entirely adequate and, in view of Bur-
roughs 5.5 clearly constitutional. The Congress exercised wise
judgment in excepting the reporting of contributions under $100.
Although not included in the final version of the Act, the
provision of the State bill for a Federal Elections Commission to
supervise the campaign funding and spending laws would have
153 A substantial loan which the successful candidate is unable to pay poses a danger of
subservience of the elected official to the lender. In a political campaign, like a horse race,
there is only one winner. Unlike a business there is no certain income or property which
can serve as security. The losing party, like the Democratic Party at the present time, finds
the debt an inhibition to an active new campaign.
154 Election Act § 401 gives to these federal agencies the power to promulgate regu-
lations with respect to the extension of credit without security, to any candidate or one
acting in his behalf by any persons regulated by these agencies.
155 Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), discussed in text accompanying
notes 75-77 supra.
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improved greatly the enforcement of these laws. The House of
Representatives has been reluctant to act against members who
allegedly violated the previous reporting laws, and it was antici-
pated that the House would insist on maintaining control over
enforcement. Perhaps after experience with the new statute the
Senate proposal may be adopted.
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the Presiden-
tial Election Campaign Fund Act provide constructive regulation
of campaign funding and spending. However, some of the provi-
sions needlessly raise substantial constitutional issues, and omis-
sion of other simple provisions renders the statutes less effective
than they could be. The modifications suggested above would
render the statutes safer from constitutional attack and more
effective in promoting a viable election process.
